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Do directors need better statutory
protection when acting on the advice
of others?
Mark Byrne*
There is a practical need for company directors to rely on advice and
information supplied by others. Theory suggests this is also a most efficient
practice that should be encouraged and supported. Failure to do so arguably
raises the cost of corporate governance and affects directors’ actions
because of the risk of personal liability. When the common law caused the
process of delegation and reliance to become problematic, amendments
were introduced to the Corporations Act to better protect the practice. This
article suggests however that these provisions now actually make the
directors’ position more difficult. Ironically they impose more stringent
requirements than would have ever been intended. There are currently
proposals to review these provisions and others to provide better protection
for directors. It is argued however that those proposals would not adequately
address the matters raised in the most recent authorities. There is a need for
better clarity of principle and process on this issue. This article suggests a
way forward that should be designed around more practical considerations
and efficiencies.
1 Introduction
It is a reality that company officers need to rely on the advice and information
provided by others within and outside their company.1 If their actions, based
upon that information or advice are inappropriate, they may be in breach of
one or more of their duties to the company. Commonly, it may be a breach of
their duty to act with care and diligence and any defence based around that
officer’s reliance on others has always been considered in the context of the
relevant duty itself.2 It was not until 1999 that ss 189 and 190 of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) were introduced to assist officers. Section 190
attempts to relieve officers from responsibility for the acts of delegates in
certain circumstances and s 189 aids the determination of when reliance on
others may be seen as being reasonable. It should be noted that s 189 operates
as a presumption,3 so ultimately it is still a question of whether the actions of
the officer, including the reliance, met the appropriate standard of their duty in
the circumstances. As will be demonstrated, neither the introduction of these
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of Business, USQ.
1 This has been recognised in Australian case law since AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR
759. Arguably it is a necessary part of corporate life given that the board simply cannot
manage day-to-day operations: The HIH Royal Commission, The Failure of HIH Insurance,
April 2003, at <http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/>, Vol 1, Pt III, para 6.2.4.
2 The question of reliance upon others as a defence has been a part of the law relating to
insolvent trading since 1993 however the focus in recent years has been more generally on
the question of an officer’s duty of care and diligence.
3 In the absence of contrary evidence the delegation and reliance will be considered
‘reasonable’ if certain conditions are met: Corporations Act s 189.
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provisions nor the developing judicial opinion has provided the sort of clarity
in the law that could be appreciated and relied upon by our company officers.
A number of recent developments have occurred which have the potential
to impact significantly on this area of corporate governance. While there is
currently a push to provide better protection to officers who necessarily rely on
the advice of others, recent decisions highlight the complexity of the problem
and the need for a better resolution to this issue. The following three matters
in particular, deserve close attention:
1. The Treasury has recently released a discussion paper intended to form
the basis of a review of civil and criminal sanctions in the Corporations Act;
Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law.4 As part of this discussion, the article
questions whether the current s 189 of the Corporations Act places too high a
burden on directors who do rely upon the information or advice of others. It
proposes that the terms of s 189 should be relaxed to make it easier for
directors to avail themselves of the presumption of ‘reasonable’ reliance.5 It is
worth noting however that this is only part of a broader agenda to better
protect directors through a more general business judgment defence applicable
to all ‘core’ duties.6
2. The case law on this issue has generally involved non-executive directors
seeking to defend actions for breach of duty based upon their ‘reasonable
reliance’ on the advice or information supplied from executives, managers or
others within the company. The most recent case to deal with this issue
however, Vines v ASIC,7 highlights that other officers, including those who are
not even directors, have a potential liability for acts done in reliance on the
advice and information of others. Interestingly in this case, the liability of the
non-director officer arose because of reliance on an executive director. Among
other issues this case shows that there may be a number of complex
relationships between corporate managers, whether they are on the board or
not, and the reliance upon others will occur up and down the chain. This
complexity and the interpretation and application of the law in this decision
highlight the need for revision.
3. Developments in this area of the law become all the more significant
considering the effect of legislative changes proposed last year by the
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee. As a result of their report,
Corporate Duties Below Board Level,8 duties and liabilities under the
Corporations Act will be extended to include a wider class of persons who
operate below board level. This then begs the question as to how the liability
of these people may affect the question of delegation to them. If they would
be liable personally for the advice or information provided, does this
strengthen the position of board members who would seek to rely upon them?
These matters have arisen independently, yet when considered together it is
obvious that the whole question of how the law treats this aspect of corporate
4 The Treasury, Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law, 2007, at
<http://www.treasury.gov.au>.
5 Ibid, p 33.
6 Ibid, p 29.
7 (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341.
8 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Corporate Duties Below Board Level:
Report, April 2006, at <http://www.camac.gov.au>.
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governance needs to be clarified. The purpose of this article is to bring these
developments into perspective against the current law on this question. It will
seek to provide a framework against which we can test the new proposals and
look for the sort of certainty of principle that corporate officers must crave.
2 The common law position prior to legislative
amendments in 1999
Statutory recognition of the directors’ need to delegate and rely on the
information and advice of others occurred first in 1993 with the introduction
of the modern version of the insolvent trading provisions. A specific defence
was introduced to allow directors to avoid liability where a competent and
reliable person had been delegated the responsibility of monitoring the
solvency of the company and it was reasonable to believe that the person was
fulfilling that responsibility.9 Apart from this specific case of financial
monitoring the legislation did not deal with the directors’ ability generally to
delegate and rely on others in the performance of their duties to the company
until 1999. It was then that the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill
introduced ss 189 and 190. It was apparent in the Explanatory Memorandum
to that bill that there were concerns over the direction the common law was
taking on this issue:
Doubts have been expressed about the extent to which it is permissible for directors,
non-executive directors in particular, to delegate functions to, and rely on, advice
and information provided by others. Uncertainty about the circumstances in which
it is appropriate for a director to delegate to, or place reliance on the advice of others
could lead to an overly conservative approach to management and could impede the
decision-making processes within a company. This is a less than optimal outcome
and is not conducive to the development of sound corporate governance practices
such as putting in place appropriate board committee systems. To remedy this, it is
proposed to provide specific legislative authority for delegation and reliance by
directors.10
To understand the reason for these doubts, it is necessary to review the case
law just prior to the legislative intervention. AWA Ltd v Daniels11 was the
landmark decision that laid the foundation to the development of modern
principles surrounding the question of when it is reasonable for directors to
rely on others. As with other decisions prior to 1999 the issue of reliance was
simply part of the overall question as to whether the directors satisfied their
duties to the company.12 In this instance reliance was being placed upon a
particular person to engage in foreign exchange transactions and management
was being relied upon to supervise and control such activity. Distinctions were
drawn, in line with the development of the duties of care and skill at that time,
between the standards of care owed by executive and non-executive officers.
9 Corporations Act s 588H(3).
10 Explanatory Memorandum to Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998,
para 6.8.
11 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
12 For an analysis of the implications of the decisions during this time refer to AComerford and
L Law, ‘Directors’ Duty of Care and the Extent of “Reasonable” Reliance and Delegation’
(1998) 16 C&SLJ 103.
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It was held that the latter were entitled to trust management and the auditors
in this instance, to identify the inappropriate conduct, and reliance on them, in
the absence of information of concern, was appropriate in the circumstances.
The chief executive officer however was held to have received sufficient
information to have been put on enquiry about the relevant rogue activities. In
a judgment representing the high water mark for directors in their need to rely
on company management, Rogers CJ included the following key statements
within his famous description of the relevant principles:
• A director is justified in trusting officers of the corporation to perform all
duties that, having regard to the exigencies of business, the intelligent
devolution of labour and the articles of association, may properly be left to
such officers . . . A director is entitled to rely without verification on the
judgment, information and advice of the officers so entrusted.
• A director is also entitled to rely on management to go carefully through
relevant financial and other information of the corporation and draw to the
board’s attention any matter requiring the board’s consideration.
• Reliance would only be unreasonable where the director was aware of
circumstances of such a character, so plain, so manifest and so simple of
appreciation that no person, with any degree of prudence, acting on his
behalf, would have relied on the particular judgment information and advice
of the officers.13
There were a number of decisions that followed AWA Ltd v Daniels14 where
reliance by directors was a critical factor in considering whether they had
satisfied the standard of the relevant duties. In the first of these, Australian
Securities Commission v Gallagher15 there was reliance by a non-executive
director on the executive of the company, Rothwells Ltd,16 for the supply of
relevant financial and other information. The question was whether someone
in the position of the director should have made independent inquiry rather
than simply rely on the information that was fed to him from the executive.
Again in this instance the director was not found to be in breach. Some key
information had been withheld from him and as he had made no independent
inquiry as to the state of the company assets he was unaware of the true
financial position of the company. Nevertheless the appeal court upheld the
finding that he had acted reasonably in the circumstances because he did take
steps to call a directors’ meeting to seek clarification and would not otherwise
have been put on notice as to the extent of the problem.
Vrisakis v Australian Securities Commission17 also arose from the failure of
Rothwells Ltd. In this instance the action was against a non-executive director,
Vrisakis, who had been appointed to the position as part of a business plan to
turn around the welfare of the company. It was then under investigation by the
National Companies and Securities Commission and the commission was
contemplating the withdrawal of the company’s security dealer’s licence. The
plan was not complied with and the company’s financial position worsened to
13 AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 868.
14 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
15 (1993) 11 WAR 105; 10 ACSR 43.
16 This was after the reconstitution of its board following investigations by the then National
Companies and Securities Commission.
17 (1993) 9 WAR 395; 11 ACSR 162.
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the point of liquidation. Essentially it was claimed the director was liable for
his failure to take reasonable steps to ensure the terms of the plan were carried
out. Although at first instance he was found liable as a result of inaction on
some particulars contained in the business plan, the Supreme Court of Western
Australia upheld an appeal on these matters. The comments by Rogers CJ in
AWA Ltd v Daniels were supported18 particularly on the issue of when a
director may be justified in trusting officers of the corporation.19 It was also
relevant in this instance to consider the reliance the director placed upon the
auditors to review the company’s loan portfolio. The court could not see how
this reliance could have been questioned in the absence of anything to suggest
there would not be a thorough and proper analysis.
Australian Securities Commission v Gallagher20 and Vrisakis v Australian
Securities Commission21 and their support of the principles from AWA Ltd v
Daniels22 were again endorsed by the Supreme Court of Western Australia in
Permanent Building Society v Wheeler.23 A short time later, AWA Ltd v
Daniels24 was also applied by Ipp J in Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd.25
In this case non-executive directors were again held not to be negligent in
relying upon the judgment of executive officers and that they would report
accurately to them. They were able to trust the executive of a joint venturer
without making independent enquiries themselves.
Eventually however the NSW Court of Appeal definitively took steps to
retreat from AWA Ltd v Daniels26 in the decision of Daniels v Anderson27
when the matter went on appeal. This became a turning point in the
development of legal principle. Although the court did not change the ultimate
findings of liability for the relevant directors, they rejected the fundamental
statements of principle enunciated by Rogers CJ. In the opinion of Clarke and
Sheller JJA, that description of the law did ‘not accurately state the extent of
the duty of directors, whether non-executive or not, in modern company
law’.28 They went on to endorse US authorities as representative of how the
law should be described in Australia. Unfortunately, from the perspective of
certainty and guidance, those authorities ranged in view from the position that
directors could not rely on the judgment of others to general statements about
the need for minimum levels of skill and a proactive approach to the
monitoring of management.
At the heart of the criticism by the Court of Appeal was clearly the view that
Rogers CJ’s description of principle could still be interpreted as supporting a
subjective test regarding the duties of directors. Clarke and Sheller JJA were
at pains to point out that the legislation and modern case law had imposed
18 Ibid, at WAR 406 per Malcolm CJ.
19 Ibid, at WAR 452 per Ipp J.
20 (1993) 11 WAR 105; 10 ACSR 43.
21 (1993) 9 WAR 395; 11 ACSR 162.
22 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
23 (1994) 11 WAR 187; 14 ACSR 109.
24 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
25 (1993) 13 WAR 11; 11 ACSR 785. As to the appeal from this decision see (1994) 13 WAR
124; 15 ACSR 1.
26 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
27 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607
28 Ibid, at NSWLR 502; ACSR 665.
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greater objective responsibilities on directors and their judgment was about
giving recognition to this. It would appear they were concerned that on
Rogers CJ’s analysis at least non-executive directors could still defend
themselves from liability based upon a general right to rely upon the
company’s management and a subjective lack of knowledge on their part of
any concerns that would circumvent the need for any independent enquiry. For
the purposes of subsequent analysis, it is suggested that a useful summary of
the principles from the Court of Appeal may be put as follows:
• That directors need to meet a minimum objective level of skill which
includes a minimum understanding of the business of the
corporation. If a director cannot meet this level they need to inform
themselves to the requisite degree or simply not act;
• Directors need to continue to keep themselves informed about the
affairs of the company generally which would include such specific
things as a regular review of financial statements;
• While directors will not be involved in day-to-day matters they need
to adequately monitor and supervise management and their practices;
• Either as a result of this monitoring or in keeping themselves
informed, they may come across information that creates a duty to
make further enquiries beyond the ordinary attention to affairs. That
is, on an objective assessment of their care and diligence they should
have recognised the need to positively act and in such circumstances
it is inadequate to say that management did not bring the particular
matter to their attention.29
In essence it is proposed that the difference of opinion on the question of
reliance is inexorably tied up with the underlying duties of care and diligence.
What is at stake is the question of when a director ought to know that further
enquiries are needed. At what point would the exercise of the appropriate
standard of care have put the director on notice that something was going
wrong? Rogers CJ was not suggesting that a non-executive director can be
entirely passive and ignore all but those problems actually brought to their
attention in all circumstances.30 It is a question of what matters can be
appropriately left to certain delegates without the need to positively check on
those outcomes and what matters, even when delegated, deserve further
independent scrutiny.31As will be analysed further, it is this practical approach
that should be favoured. Such a view supports certainty and clarity and is
29 This summary is the author’s attempt to bring together the broad principles of the
US authorities relied upon and endorsed in the judgment: Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37
NSWLR 438 at 502–5; 16 ACSR 607 at 665–7. Those authorities included Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation v Bierman 2 F 3d 1424 (1993); Rankin v Cooper 149 F 1010 (1907);
Francis v United Jersey Bank 432 A 2d 814 (1981); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
v Stanley 770 F Supp 1281 (ND Ind, 1991).
30 AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 874–5. It is clear from this part of the judgment
that Rogers CJ was concerned with the question of whether the non-executive directors
‘ought to have been aware’ of the relevant problems. In the circumstances however there
was no evidence to suggest the directors could not rely on the internal controls that had been
put in place and in fact had received information that they were being carried out.
31 This was one of those cases where the directors were entitled to rely on management (and
auditors) to supervise in a manner the board had approved and objectively there was no
reason to suggest this was not occurring appropriately.
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likely to reflect the realities of corporate governance. It does not mean that
directors are not subject to the need to investigate when the objective
assessment of their duty dictates this, but may still create some reliable norms
of practice.
The subsequent decision of Re Property Force Consultants Pty Ltd32 was
again critical of Rogers CJ in AWA Ltd v Daniels33 and supportive of the
judgment in Daniels v Anderson.34 When it came to the application of these
principles however the result was very interesting. This case involved two
directors of a land development company. One director who had primarily
looked after the company’s financial affairs managed to misappropriate
company funds through an account jointly held with the other director. That
other director was brought into the company because of expertise in town
planning and failed to pick up on the fraud. While the court emphasised that
his specialist role did not affect a general duty to pay attention to the financial
matters they nevertheless found he was not in breach of duty as a result of
trusting the conduct of his fellow director. Apparently in these circumstances
there was no reason to suspect irregularities in the finances. Despite the fact
that he had little direct prior knowledge of the work or ethics of the other
director he was apparently justified in placing trust in his control and reporting
of the financial matters. Clearly, in the application of the relevant principles
there is a softening in the approach.
3 The case for the introduction of ss 189 and 190 to
the Corporations Act
The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act of 1999 introduced a
number of amendments that affected the duties of directors and their related
abilities to delegate and rely on the advice of others. Arguably these changes,
at least in part, were in response to business concerns about the direction of
the law as a result of Daniels v Anderson35 and related decisions. This view
is best expressed in the blunt terms of Frank Carrigan as follows:
The CLERPA contains a number of legislative provisions aimed at transcending the
impact of the Daniels case. Apart from the introduction of the statutory business
judgment rule and reformulation of the duty of care, there are new provisions
covering the ability of directors to delegate duties and rely on information provided
by others. If executed in line with ss 189, 190 and 198D, any breach of the duty of
care will be expunged by the director taking advantage of these safe harbour
provisions. In effect, these new provisions undercut the guidelines on the power of
directors to delegate and rely on others propounded by Clarke and Sheller JJA in the
Daniels case. Codification of the power to delegate and rely on others is based on
the soft approach taken by Rogers CJ in the AWA case. The safe harbour for reliance
circumvents the Daniels case that rejected the view that non-executive directors, in
particular, could rely on information provided by others. Business had found the
32 [1997] 1 Qd R 300; (1995) 13 ACLC 1051.
33 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
34 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
35 Ibid.
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jurisprudence of Rogers CJ suited their view of corporate regulatory ideology. The
AWA case was used as a Trojan horse to sidestep the Daniels case and gain directors
the legislative law they desired.36
The first relevant case after this time was Sheahan As Liquidator of SA
Service Stations (In Liq) v Verco.37 The application of ss 189 and 190 did not
arise given the timing of the relevant events and so the question of whether it
was appropriate for the non-executive directors to have relied upon the chief
executive officer in the manner they did turned upon an analysis of the general
principles that support the statutory and common law duty of care and
diligence. Nevertheless it provides useful insight into the application of the
relevant principles. In this case two non-executive directors sought to defend
actions for breaches of the duty of care and diligence38 by their reliance on the
chief executive officer or managing director. This person had secured their
investment by misleading them as to the true financial position of the
company. The duped directors were held to be liable. They were in breach of
their duty because they had failed to inform themselves at all regarding the
affairs of the company. In reviewing the authorities on the question of reliance
the court clearly supported the principles laid down in Daniels v Anderson.39
Further authorities were reviewed that considered the position of directors
who had not adequately involved themselves and kept abreast of the affairs of
the company.40 In line with those authorities the liability for the non-executive
directors in this case was quite clear. They knew nothing of the businesses of
the company (service stations) and did not want to be involved in their
management. They wanted a ‘sleeping’ role. On the basis of the principles of
the duty as it had developed to this point that was clearly inappropriate. This
was a case that neatly fell at one end of the spectrum of director performance.
They had no understanding of the bare minimum expected of them under the
duty and under any view of the principles that should be applied liability was
inevitable.
What is interesting however is that Mullighan J went on to consider what
they could have done to satisfy their obligations in their particular
circumstances. As discussed throughout all the authorities mentioned, they
needed to have taken positive steps to inform themselves about the affairs of
the company generally and about its true financial position more particularly:
Had they done so and found it to be financially healthy and well managed with
appropriate procedures for reporting through the chief executive officer to the board
36 F Carrigan, ‘The role of capital in regulating the duty of care and business judgment rule’
(2002) 14 Aust Jnl Corp Law 215.
37 (2001) 79 SASR 109; 37 ACSR 117; 19 ACLC 814.
38 Section 232(4) of the Corporations Law as the forerunner to s 180 of the Corporations Act
2001 was considered given the timing of the company’s failure.
39 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
40 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115; 9 ACLC 946; Metal
Manufacturers Ltd v Lewis (1988) 13 NSWLR 315; 13 ACLR 357; 6 ACLC 725; Statewide
Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405; 8 ACLC 827; Morley v Statewide
Tobacco Services Ltd [1993] 1 VR 423; (1992) 8 ACSR 305; 10 ACLC 1,233.
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of directors, it may be expected that they could have left many matters to [the chief
executive officer] and staff of the Company without being in breach of their duty as
directors.41
So the issue was not that the non-executive directors could not have relied
upon the chief executive officer or employees of the company but that this was
not defendable where those directors had not first satisfied themselves about
the financial position of the company and the management, reporting and
monitoring systems that should be in place. If they had done that, could they
have indeed left matters to the chief executive officer without the need to
further check on them and verify their status? Apparently so.
This case confirms that the focus of Daniels v Anderson42 and the cases that
followed were on clarifying the direction of the development of the duty of
care and diligence. The courts were pushing the following principles:
• Directors needed to accept the move towards an objective assessment
of their obligations and those expectations had grown and were
continuing to develop.
• As part of this assessment, directors needed to actively take steps to
appropriately inform themselves about the affairs of the company,
particularly its true financial status.
• Delegation and reliance on others was considered as one factor in the
application of the duty. That delegation and reliance on others was
not appropriate where directors would have failed to meet minimum
expectations of their own active investigations.
Despite some concern initially perhaps about the meaning of Daniels v
Anderson,43 the cases clearly would support delegation and reliance on others
but only where it is reasonable in the circumstances. Reasonable it would
seem in the sense that the directors had at least met minimum standards in
satisfying themselves that appropriate systems were in place to monitor and
keep abreast of the financial and other key affairs of the company. While it is
hard to pin down all those circumstances where reliance will be reasonable the
more interesting question becomes this: If it were reasonable to delegate and
rely on that person, to what extent does the director themself have to take
positive steps to investigate the veracity of the advice or information received?
Do they have to keep making independent enquiries to verify the accuracy of
what they receive? It was these matters that were at the heart of the original
judgment in AWA Ltd v Daniels44 that was so criticised and it is still the matter
which poses most conjecture.
4 What effect has ss 189 and 190 had on the
developing legal principles?
A review of more recent decisions provides some appreciation as to whether
the purpose of the legislative changes in s 189 and s 190 has been achieved.
Have the courts taken to the amendments and softened their view on the
41 (2001) 79 SASR 109 at 135; 37 ACSR 117; 19 ACLC 814 at 836.
42 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
43 Ibid.
44 (1992) 7 ACSR 759 at 868.
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question of delegation and reliance? This review will suggest this has not been
the case and therefore it is perhaps not surprising that further changes to s 189
are now proposed.
The most significant case since the introduction of these provisions was
ASIC v Adler.45 It was significant in this context, not because of the
circumstances of the case itself but because of the clear statements of
principle. The question of delegation and reliance arose as a minor part in
relation to a number of breaches of directors’ duties following the failure of
HIH Insurance Ltd. In this particular instance the question was whether
Mr Williams, as chief executive officer could have relied upon Mr Adler to
handle a particular financial transaction in a legal and appropriate manner in
the interests of the company. It was clear that Mr Williams could not rely upon
s 190 to support such delegation where there was an obvious conflict of
interest in Mr Adler. Because the delegation was not defendable in any event,
the question of how s 189 may apply was not canvassed. The decision itself
however does provide a neat summary of general principles on the issue and
provides telling commentary on the relationship between those principles and
the then new provisions.
Firstly it was confirmed that:
at general law, a director is entitled to rely without verification on the judgment,
information and advice of management and other officers appropriately so entrusted.
However, reliance would be unreasonable where directors know, or by the exercise
of ordinary care should have known, any facts that would deny reliance on others:
Daniels t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells at ACSR 665–6.46
Secondly, the following factors were identified as being important to
determining the reasonableness of any reliance and delegation:
(a) the function that has been delegated;
(b) the extent to which the director is put on inquiry, or ought to have
been put on inquiry;
(c) the director must believe that the delegate is trustworthy, competent
and someone on whom reliance can be placed;
(d) the risk involved and nature of the transaction;
(e) the extent of steps taken by the director, for example, inquiries made
or other circumstances engendering ‘trust’; and
(f) whether the position of the director is executive or non-executive.47
Finally, what is of particular interest is that rather than seeing s 190 as
supporting delegation and then consequently reliance on that delegation, it has
been interpreted as being consistent with the more stringent interpretation of
principle held in Daniels v Anderson. It was certainly the view of Santow J
that any tension in principle between Daniels v Anderson48 and AWA Ltd v
Daniels49 was now irrelevant as s 190 now meant that in any event the essence
of the principle relied upon by the trial judge could no longer stand. It was
now wholly inconsistent with s 190 to claim: ‘A director being entitled to rely,
45 (2002) 41 ACSR 72; 20 ACLC 576.
46 Ibid, at ACSR 167.
47 Ibid, at ACSR 167–8.
48 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
49 (1992) 7 ACSR 759.
Do directors need better statutory protection? 247
without verification, on the judgment, information and advice of the officers so
entrusted.’50
Rather than help the cause of directors, s 190 has served only to confirm a
more stringent application of principle. Santow J’s discussion of principle and
application in this case on the issue of delegation and reliance by Williams
was supported by the Court of Appeal in Adler v ASIC.51
ASIC v Rich52 evidences an even more obvious example of inappropriate
delegation and reliance. In this case the chairman of a publicly listed company,
simply relied upon unsatisfactory financial information supplied by
management, without question. No steps were taken to ensure the board was
receiving adequate or accurate data and it was accepted the reliance was
unreasonable. By any analysis, liability should flow and the case did not test
the issues in question here.
The strongest analysis regarding the effect of ss 189 and 190 to the general
principles of delegation and reliance comes in the form of the final report of
the HIH Royal Commission.53 The succinct views of the Commissioner,
Mr Justice Owen, are clear in the following extract:
In Daniels v Anderson . . . the court, at first glance, appeared to place very stringent
limitations on the notion of reliance and delegation. But I do not think this is a
correct reading of the decision. In any event the legislature has specifically
recognised the power of delegation . . . I think Daniels v Anderson and other
authorities establish the general proposition that directors can rely on information
supplied by others provided the reliance is reasonable in all the circumstances.54
Mr Justice Owen went on to elaborate on the factors that would impact on
the reasonableness of the reliance and these included:
• The nature of the functions delegated or in respect of which the information
was given;
• The nature of the transaction or event to which the information relates and,
in particular, the risk that it involves;
• The relationship between the director and provider of the information.55
However the most important element to his mind was the extent to which
the director had made enquiries regarding the relevant matter and that s 189
demonstrated the proper approach. That is, the director must make an
independent assessment of the information or advice, having regard to the
matters specified in s 189(b)(ii).56
So the curious result is that while it is acknowledged that a strict reading of
Daniels v Anderson57 is not appropriate, the interpretation of s 189 supports a
very severe limitation on the principles of reliance in any event. Requiring an
independent assessment on every occasion of reliance in order to take
advantage of s 189 would, as it has been shown in the above case analysis, go
50 (2002) 41 ACSR 72 at 182; 20 ACLC 576 in reference to AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ACSR
759.
51 (2003) 46 ACSR 504; 179 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 131; BC200303670 at [529]–[530].
52 (2004) 50 ACSR 500; 22 ACLC 1232; [2004] NSWSC 836; BC200406016.
53 The HIH Royal Commission, above n 1.
54 Ibid, Ch 6 para 6.2.4
55 Ibid, Ch 6 para 6.2.4
56 Ibid, Ch 6 para 6.2.4
57 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
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further than general principles would dictate.58 The very purpose of the
introduction of ss 189 and 190 was to try and make it easier for directors to
delegate and leave matters to those who, on the face of it, can be trusted. It is
ironic that the provisions were meant to overcome the perceived strictness of
Daniels v Anderson.59 Now that subsequent analysis and actual applications of
principle suggest a softer approach it is interesting that the interpretation of
s 189 would provide a greater hurdle. Section 189 itself may now be making
matters more difficult for directors than was ever the case as a result of
Daniels v Anderson.60
5 The latest authority: Vines v ASIC
The most recent judicial guidance on the question of the ability to delegate and
rely on the advice of others comes in the form of Vines v ASIC.61 This was an
appeal from three previous judgments regarding breaches of the duty of care
and diligence62 by a chief financial officer, Mr Geoffrey William Vines. In
many of the cases reviewed in this area it is commonly a non-executive officer
who is trying to defend against potential liability on the basis that they
reasonably relied upon the information or advice of executive officers or other
company managers. The first interesting thing to note about this case is that it
is an executive officer, who is not even a director, who is trying to defend
himself with the claim that it was reasonable for him to rely on the veracity
of information supplied by an executive director. His position however was
likened to that of a non-executive officer in the sense that he was dependent
upon the company’s executives to provide him with relevant up to date
information.63 In his particular role he was operating at a level of corporate
strategy and managerial direction. What was expected of his role was ‘a level
of scrutiny as befits supervision, not the detailed direct involvement that is
associated with operational responsibility’.64
Vines was chief financial officer of the GIO Group. This company was the
subject of a hostile takeover bid by AMP Ltd. As a result, Vines assumed
further and particular work in his company’s response to the takeover
including, among many others, involvement in the preparation of the Part B
statement required from the target company under the then Corporations Law
and special responsibility with respect to the integrity of the profit forecast
included in that statement. This profit forecast proved to be wholly
inappropriate and, in part, Vines was liable for signing off on it when he
‘ought to have known’ it was improbable and for failing to inform the relevant
58 Note that the requirement for an independent assessment inserted just prior to approval (ie,
s 189(b)(ii)) means there is a need to consider relevant views and materials and bring own
judgment to bear on the matter: Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment & Trading Co
Ltd (1990) 56 SASR 455; 3 ACSR 207; 8 ACLC 1151; Blackwell v Moray (1991) 5 ACSR
255; 9 ACLC 924
59 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
60 Ibid.
61 (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341.
62 Note that these breaches relate to s 232(4) of the Corporations Law given that the conduct
related to a period around 1998.
63 (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341 at [734] per
Santow JA (dissenting judgment).
64 Ibid, at [731].
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due diligence committee of that improbability. The crux of the matter for the
purposes of this article is that the profit forecast was crucially dependent upon
an estimate of the exposure of liability of the company to claims arising out
of a particular hurricane. Vines relied on the computations and advice of
Mr Fox, an executive director, for the details of that estimate. This was
arguably not a matter on which Vine had direct operational responsibility but
did fall within his supervisory role.65 To a large degree the liability of Vine
turned on the question of whether it was reasonable for him to have relied on
that estimate provided by Fox without further inquiry or independent review
and therefore whether he ought to have known that the estimate was
inaccurate, bringing about a breach of his duty of care and diligence.
The Court of Appeal found by a majority of 2:1 that liability for Vines was
appropriate in these circumstances. In essence the majority found that while
Vines may have been entitled to rely upon Fox’s assessment at one time,
circumstances subsequently arose that required Vines to become proactive and
instigate inquiries. Those inquiries would have revealed the real exposure of
risk and accordingly was something Vines ‘ought to have known’. Two
particular circumstances that raised the duty of inquiry in this case included,
receiving information indicating dramatic rises in claims from the hurricane
and learning that retrocession insurance cover to assist GIO to protect itself
against claims from the hurricane could not be regarded as effective. There
were however, at least in the opinion of Ipp J, several warning signs. Had
Vines then checked on the claims he would have found the risk had been
seriously underestimated and therefore that GIO’s profit forecast would have
been inaccurate.
The difference between the majority and the dissenting opinion of Santow J
does not lie on the question of interpretation of legal principle and statutory
duty. Rather, it seems to turn on the particular complex facts regarding the
special responsibilities of Vines and what he may have known over the
relevant period. It was much more significant for Santow J to confirm that
Vines, in his opinion, had a supervisory role not an operational role and that
it was wholly appropriate in these circumstances (rather like the position of
non-executive director) to rely on the executive director to provide the
relevant ‘up-to-date’ information on the likely losses from the hurricane. From
his perspective there were no circumstances, nor anything in the conduct of
his advisor, nor anything from his own field of responsibilities that should
have excited suspicion and put him on inquiry.66
Though dissenting, Santow J does provide very useful commentary
specifically on the legal principles underpinning an officer’s ability to rely on
others. Interestingly he seems to regard the purpose of the judgment of Clarke
and Sheller JJA in Daniels v Anderson67 was to raise the standard for
non-executive directors so it is closer to those of executive directors.68 The
65 Note the view of the Chief Justice that the estimate of liability was a matter over which
Vines had express responsibility because of its place in the Part B statement and that this was
not an operational issue: (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75;
BC200702341 at [727].
66 Ibid, at [734].
67 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607.
68 (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341 at [730].
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evil that needed to be overcome was the wilful blindness of such officers.
Reliance on others could not be seen as a means of avoiding their underlying
duty to the company. But it will be perfectly permissible to have such reliance
in the appropriate circumstances and those circumstances are inexorably
connected to the duty itself. In reliance on ASIC v Adler69 his honour
described the focus as being on:
• The characteristics of the company;
• The skills and experience of the officer concerned and the delegate;
• The reasonably anticipated risks entailed in the reliance.70
Most importantly he goes on to discuss when there would be a need for
independent scrutiny or monitoring. ‘Where there is no cause for suspicion
nor circumstances demanding critical and detailed attention, it is reasonable
for an officer to rely on advice, without independently verifying the
information or scrutinising the data or circumstances upon which that advice
is based.’71
So despite the dire interpretations that flowed following the judgment of
Clarke and Sheller JJA in Daniels v Anderson there is no doubt about an
officer’s ability to delegate and to rely on the advice and information of others.
What has been a struggle is to bring the principles together in a more
meaningful way that can provide practical, on the ground, guidance. It is
understood that officers who put their heads in the sand and cannot satisfy
minimum expectations in terms of keeping themselves informed do not
deserve a defence that others were responsible for supplying relevant
information. Their own independent enquiry and analysis must be brought to
bear on the matter. The real problem area for finding a consistent approach lies
in the case where there is appropriate delegation. When will the officer have
to check or question that reliance? It seems there can never be a situation
where it can be said that an officer will never have to verify the advice or
information. It may certainly be reasonable not to do so where you have good
monitoring systems in place, and nothing arises that puts you on enquiry, but
there is evidently an underlying principle that runs through the duty of care
and diligence itself that cannot be ignored. Even in the absence of matters that
put you on enquiry your duty of care and diligence is controlled by the nature
and extent of the foreseeable risk of harm for the company. So the latest
authorities mean the question of delegation and reliance can never be reduced
to a matter of process.
It is worth looking closely at the judgments of Spigelman CJ and Ipp J. At
least for the Chief Justice it was not necessary to find Vines was put on notice
by a particular event to check on Fox’s estimate.72 It was part of his underlying
responsibilities. While Ipp J described the various warnings that should have
put Vines on notice he emphasised the significance of putting the relevant
events in the context of the overall duty. The question then of whether the duty
has been met ‘can only be answered by balancing the foreseeable risk of harm
against the potential benefits that could reasonably have been expected to
69 (2002) 41 ACSR 72; 20 ACLC 576.
70 (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341 at [731].
71 Ibid, at [731].
72 Ibid, at [447].
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accrue to the company from the conduct in question’.73 The point is that in
circumstances like this where the consequences of getting it wrong were so
grave the duty itself may require something more of you than acceptance of
the advice of others without question or verification even where delegation to
that person may have been appropriate.
It is this requirement that brings any reliable delegation process unstuck.
Even if you could demonstrate appropriate behaviour in all other respects the
matter itself which is the subject of delegation may mean further is required.
With respect, how one makes that assessment is always going to be a matter
of conjecture and one which is difficult to implement in any decisive way. This
should be the focus of any attempt to practically assist directors. It is this
factor, more than any other, that will perpetuate the legal uncertainty
surrounding the acts of delegation and reliance.
Santow J, the judge who gave us the most cogent and clear analysis of the
law in ASIC v Adler,74 also gives us a dissenting judgment in Vines v ASIC75
and it is this judgment that highlights this new underlying problem for
directors. Santow J makes the following interesting analogy in finding the
chief financial officer was not in breach of duty when relying on the advice
and information from an executive director: ‘Mr Vines having a dog on the
job, did not need to bark as well, unless he had reason to believe the dog was
asleep on the job. I conclude he did not.’76 Unfortunately it now appears the
matter is not as simple as that. If what you are protecting is important enough
and the consequences of the failure to bark serious enough you may well have
to find your voice and take more responsibility for that bark. The problem
however is knowing when that has to happen.
6 The current proposal to relax the terms of s 189
and a new broader business judgment defence
The matter which has brought ss 189 and 190 back into the spotlight along
with the whole question of delegation and reliance by company officers is the
current discussion paper from the Corporations and Financial Services
Division of The Treasury, Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law.77 Despite its
name ‘the tone, focus and substance of the discussion paper seem to be set
more upon minimising the regulatory burden on companies rather than
striking hard against corporate misconduct’.78
In this vein, there are two proposals contained in the paper that will have an
impact. Firstly, there is the suggestion that the current wording of s 189 (in
particular, s 189(b)(ii)) places too high a burden on directors in trying to take
advantage of the presumption. That is, that s 189(b)(ii) actually requires
directors in every instance to make an independent assessment of the
73 Ibid, at [814] per Ipp J in reference back to his own judgment in Vrisakis v Australian
Securities Commission (1993) 9 WAR 395 at 449–50; 11 ACSR 162.
74 (2002) 41 ACSR 72; 20 ACLC 576.
75 (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341.
76 Ibid, at [738].
77 Above n 4.
78 A Dahdal, ‘Sanctions in Corporate Law’, 31 May 2007, Australian Corporate News, CCH,
at <http://ww5.cch.com.au/acn/acn10.html>.
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information or advice on which they want to rely. As discussed above this is
a fundamental practical issue. That close analysis of the general principles as
they have developed would suggest that interpretation is not consistent with
the current view of the courts. Provided one meets the minimum expectations
in terms of keeping oneself informed there is scope for appropriate delegation
and reliance on that delegation without the constant need for the independent
assessment of the received information or advice unless of course matters
arose which put you on enquiry. What has been proposed is that the wording
of the provision, revert to the terms originally proposed when it was in bill
form.79 That is, that reliance would be made in good faith and ‘after making
proper inquiry if the circumstances indicated the need for inquiry’.80 The
intention obviously is to remove the requirement for constant independent
assessments. As suggested earlier, s 189 and s 190, despite intentions at the
time, may have only served to hamper the development of appropriate law on
this issue. Not only is the amendment more supportive of officers and the
practicalities of corporate governance it would better serve the original intent.
What we still need to come to terms with however is that it may not assist
directors to the extent first thought when you review the meaning of the
judgments above. It still will not affect the overarching factor applied in Vines
v ASIC81 above. That is, the ‘foreseeable risk of harm’ element that will undo
any attempt to develop a reliable process.
The second proposal in the discussion paper is a general defence for
directors to be protected from liability under the core duties (ss 180–183) and
insolvent trading provisions (s 588G). The relief from liability might apply to
decisions made where the directors act:
• in a bone fide manner;
• within the scope of the corporation’s business;
• reasonably and incidentally to the corporation’s business; and
• for the corporation’s benefit.
Clearly there will be much further debate and analysis of the merits of such
a general defence but it would also have a consequence to the question of
delegation and reliance. As already mentioned, s 189 operates as a
presumption in favour of directors who rely upon others. Ultimately the
appropriateness of that reliance comes down to a question of whether they
have met the standards of the underlying duty. The proposed general defence
would have the potential to protect them against that liability arising from
decisions made on the basis of information and advice received from others.
However again it is doubtful whether such a general defence would overcome
the claim that the conduct, in this case delegation and reliance, was a breach
of duty because subsequent analysis determines what was then a ‘foreseeable
risk of harm’.
79 Note that the government at the time agreed to amend the provision to its current wording
in order to secure passage of the bill: The Treasury, above n 4, para 3.20.
80 Ibid, para 3.22.
81 (2007) 62 ACSR 1; 25 ACLC 448; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341.
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7 Economic analysis in support of a simpler and
clearer legal framework
For a long time economic theory has sought to explain the nature of the firm
and the consequences of having a limited liability corporation. Theoretically,
the corporation provides a structure that appropriately distributes risk to allow
for entrepreneurial activity. Economic analysis supports the efficiencies that
the corporation provides, although there has always been debate regarding the
extent of the benefits for the various stakeholders.82 Within the corporation
itself that same analysis would support the most efficient management and
decision-making processes. Information should be gathered and interpreted
where it is most efficient to do so. That will ultimately be passed up to the
board for decision-making or action of some kind. The more the law interferes
with the process the less cost effective and more complicated it becomes.
While the law has shown some support for delegation and reliance, it does
so with some strong limitations that principally revolve around the director’s
need to make enquiries and be informed about the matter and or the adviser
and not always on clear grounds. Arguably, the more we require of directors
to verify the information and advice sought the more inefficient the process.
Account needs to be taken of the associated costs of the monitoring required
of those on whom you need to rely.
The issue has been most succinctly put by Whincop in his article on the
economic analysis of directors’ duties:
the corporation is a prime example of specialisation of risk bearing, management
and, in the case of directors, corporate governance and monitoring. It makes sense
that decisions are delegated to persons in the organisation who make them most
efficiently. That will rarely be the directors. Unquestionably, there is the potential for
frauds to occur under these circumstances. Managers may act incompetently or
corruptly. Incompetent management provides no basis for imposing any duty on
directors or limiting their capacity to rely on managers. Other forms of checks and
balances operate: the work of managers is reviewed by decision controlled
mechanisms hierarchically and laterally. So far as corruption is concerned, managers
may be likely to conceal their frauds. Yet this provides no basis for limiting the
reliance directors may place on managers, unless one improbably assumes that
directors have a comparative advantage in detecting these frauds. The appropriate
means for preventing corruption is the development of an ethical corporate culture,
and the use of mandatory law aimed directly at fraudulent conduct by employees and
officers . . .83
82 That analysis can be followed through the following key publications across the law and
economics literature: R H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Jnl of Law and
Economics 1; J M Landers, ‘Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in
Bankruptcy’ (1976) 43 Uni of Chicago L Rev 527; F H Easterbrook and D R Fischel,
‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (1985) 52 Uni of Chicago L Rev 89; F H Easterbrook
and D R Fischel, The Economic structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press,
1991; R H Kraakman, ‘Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls’
(1984) 93 Yale L Jnl 857; P Halpern, M Trebilcock and S Turnbull, ‘An Economic Analysis
of Limited Liability in Corporation Law’ (1980) 30 Uni of Toronto L Jnl 117; M Jensen,
‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976)
Jnl of Financial Economics 305.
83 M JWhincop, ‘ATheoretical and Policy Critique of the Modern Reformulation of Directors’
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There will be failures as a result of actions taken on the advice of others, but
this does not necessarily mean reliance on the advice was inappropriate and
should have a legal consequence. The point has been made, time and time
again, in the law and economics literature that company directors are poor risk
bearers. This does not mean that directors should not have potential personal
liability but where that risk cannot be appropriately managed there are natural
negative consequences, particularly where the liability is uncertain. Those
consequences include increases in the cost of corporate governance as
compensation for the increased personal risk and a shift away from risky
activities. Corporations by their nature were created as a vehicle to engage in
the riskier ventures.
As already demonstrated the most significant issue is that a director could
not, with any confidence, consider the question of delegation and reliance as
a process that can be checked. If it could be then the uncertainty is removed
and directors can manage the risk more appropriately. The associated agency
and monitoring costs are reduced and efficiencies are gained. To achieve this,
the law needs to refine its requirements. The thread running through all the
cases on this topic is the fact that there will be delegation to and reliance on
others. What needs to be removed is any uncertainty about the process and its
consequences. Where directors meet their minimum standard of duty with
regard to being informed about the company’s financial status and
performance then the law should consider the matter procedurally. That is,
provided the delegation and reliance is reasonable given the skills of the
parties and provided nothing arises to put the officer on enquiry the action
should be defendable. No doubt officers would welcome the potential to avoid
subsequent revision of the decision-making process, where with the benefit of
hindsight, the relevant risk was found be much greater and the law determines
either that delegation was not appropriate or that greater monitoring of that
delegation was required.
When looking back at decisions made on the advice of others it may be
possible to identify where the advice was fraudulently or incompetently given.
Where the delegation of that work was appropriate in the sense described
above, holding the director responsible for the incompetence or fraud of the
other assumes that could be controlled by the director. The director may be in
no better position than anyone else to detect this. Surely the more appropriate
response is to let the liability lie where it should. Where the advisers take some
part in management it will be more likely that they themselves will have a
personal liability for their work and surely that is the more appropriate
consequence.
8 The consequences of the new potential liabilities
for managers below board level
After the failure of the HIH insurance group in 2001, Mr Justice Owen
conducted a Royal Commission to report on the reasons for, and
Duties of Care’ (1996) 6 Aust Jnl Corp Law 72 with reference to E F Fama and M C Jensen,
‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26 Jnl of Law and Economics 301–25 and
W G Ouchi, ‘Markets, Bureaucracies and Clans’ (1980) 25 Administrative Science Quarterly
124–41.
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circumstances surrounding, that collapse.84 He recognised the reality that the
governance of larger corporations is dependent upon advice and information
from personnel such as employees, consultants and advisers who are
delegated certain functions. Further, significant decisions may be made by
management without reference to the board.85 The Commissioner therefore
voiced his frustration by the disinclination of ‘middle management’ in the case
of HIH to accept responsibility for undesirable decisions and practices that
ultimately brought the company undone. It was clearly his view that corporate
governance, as a matter of practice, extends beyond the board room and to be
effective the law needs to deal with that.86
In April last year, as a result of the Royal Commission and subsequent
discussion papers, the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee
recommended that the Corporations Act be amended to extend the duties and
liabilities of officers to a wider class of persons. As a result, liability will
extend to managers, consultants and advisers who are not directors but who
may take part or are concerned in the management of the corporation.87
Clearly any potential liability for directors flowing from delegation to and
reliance upon company management should take into account the duties and
liabilities those delegates themselves will have to the company.
9 Conclusions and recommendations
This article has sought to distil the key principles that inevitably directors
must consider in delegating functions and relying on the advice and
information supplied by others. That analysis has revealed that this issue has
been caught up in the development of the fiduciary duties and in that growth
of principle directors have been left with considerably less certainty than is
practically needed. The law has clearly never recognised that directors could
rely on others as a means of avoiding their underlying duty to the company.
Objective standards must be reached. What has been more difficult is
determining the risk of liability where the delegation has been appropriate and
takes place within good governance systems. In those circumstances it is still
necessary to understand that directors may be put on enquiry to look further
into the matter should issues arise that raise any suspicion. However, it seems
more may be required. If an assessment after the fact suggests the foreseeable
risk was greater than was obviously made by the company officer (otherwise
it would not have been made in the first place) the whole question of whether
the delegation should have been made and therefore whether any
consequential advice was reliable is brought back into issue. It is argued that
the uncertainty that this generates outweighs its merit.
It is proposed that the question of delegation and reliance should be
considered with more procedural certainty. Provided officers themselves are
84 The HIH Royal Commission, above n 1
85 Ibid, Ch 6 p 15.
86 Ibid, Ch 6 p 15. See also M Byrne, ‘The Duties and Liabilities of Persons Below Board
Level’ (2006) 9 Canberra L Rev 45 at 49.
87 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, above n 8. The first two recommendations
of the committee at p 35 contain the key amendments that will allow the application of the
duties in ss 180, 181 and 184 of the Corporations Act to ‘any person who takes part, or is
concerned, in the management of that corporation’.
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meeting minimum expectations in terms of their own standard of duty then
allow the process of delegation and reliance on others where it has met the
appropriate procedures outlined throughout the cases.88Where officers receive
information that puts this into question89 there is the need to investigate and
inaction will create the risk of liability. Otherwise however officers should not
have to revisit the issue. The certainty that this will provide would arguably
reduce some angst and cost associated with corporate governance and promote
more efficient processes. This could be achieved by redrafting ss 189 and 190
to raise the presumption in this fashion. Alternatively the proposed new and
broader business judgment defence might allow officers to prevent that post
risk analysis by the courts that has been the basis for opening up and
reviewing the whole question of delegation in the first place. As mentioned
earlier however that defence should specifically address this issue as it
arguably would not go far enough in its current proposed format.
88 For example, that the delegate has the appropriate skills.
89 Or where of course they ought to have suspected problems based upon an objective
assessment of their duty.
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